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THE AGE OF FORGOTTEN INNOCENCE:  
THE DANGERS OF APPLYING ANALOG 
RESTRICTIONS TO INNOCENT INFRINGEMENT 
IN THE DIGITAL ERA 
Brian Sheridan*
 
 
Recently, two popular topics of discussion within intellectual property 
law have been the statutory damage regime and the legality of peer-to-peer 
(P2P) downloading.  This Note examines a rarely discussed interplay 
between these two concepts:  the innocent infringement defense.  Innocent 
infringement allows a court to dramatically reduce the minimum statutory 
damage award for an act of copyright infringement from $750 to $200 per 
act.  Both the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have found that § 402(d) of the 
Copyright Act eliminates innocent infringement as a matter of law in a P2P 
download setting. 
This Note examines those circuits’ reasoning as well as the various 
responses from the legal academic community.  It argues against those 
circuits’ interpretation of the phrase “access to published phonorecords,” 
found in § 402(d), to mean a general availability and a duty to inquire as to 
the copyright status of the songs in question.  By viewing § 402(d) in this 
light, those courts have effectively eliminated the defense when applied to 
P2P downloading.  This Note advocates for an actual inquiry into a 
defendant’s state of mind to determine if they had “reason to believe” their 
actions constituted infringement, which would preserve innocent 
infringement in a digital environment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Compare two scenes.  In the first, a teenage girl comes home from 
school, goes on her computer, and downloads a handful of songs through a 
peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing network.1  The other takes place in New 
York City’s Chinatown in the late 1980s.  Gift shops and flea markets are 
cashing in on the buzz surrounding the film Batman2 and making a fortune 
selling anything they can bearing that infamous bat symbol.3
Without analyzing the relative legal standards, which of these two 
copyright infringers would you say deserved to claim their innocence—and 
essentially their ignorance of the copyright violation—to reduce their 
liability in damages?  This Note explores the rationale courts have 
employed in granting innocent infringer mitigation in the commercial 
context
 
4 but not in the digital download scenario5 in which defendants 
claim a similar “[l]ack of legal sophistication.”6
 
 1. See Maverick Recording Co. v. Harper, 598 F.3d 193, 194–95 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 590 (2010). 
 
 2. BATMAN (Warner Brothers 1989). 
 3. See, e.g., D.C. Comics Inc. v. Mini Gift Shop, 912 F.2d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 4. See id. at 37. 
 5. See Harper, 598 F.3d at 199; BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 892 (7th Cir. 
2005). 
 6. Harper, 598 F.3d at 199; see also D.C. Comics, 912 F.2d at 35 (noting the level of 
sophistication of the defendants). 
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Innocent infringement is a component of copyright law’s statutory 
damages scheme.7  A court may mitigate a damage award to no lower than 
$200 if it finds that the infringer “was not aware and had no reason to 
believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright.”8  This 
defense is therefore pertinent to downloading pirated music because 
defendants often infringe on multiple songs, which increases their total 
statutory damage penalty.9
Both the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have relied on § 402(d) of the 
Copyright Act in denying innocent infringement mitigation in a P2P 
downloading scenario.
 
10  This section bars mitigation if the infringer had 
“access” to a published “phonorecord” marked with the appropriate 
copyright notice.11
First, it steps away from the original legislative intent for a general 
protection of innocent infringers.
  This Note argues that those circuits’ interpretation of 
the word “access,” in the context of digital downloading, is problematic for 
a variety of reasons. 
12  Second, by not inquiring as to whether 
the defendant actually had “access” to the published records, those courts 
have ignored the differences between the modern world and the analog 
world in which those provisions were written.13  Lastly, given the typical 
infringer’s claims of naïveté and innocence,14 the commonality of P2P 
downloading as a new social “norm” justifies the defense’s application or, 
at the very least, its consideration.15  Furthermore, this Note is timely 
because the applicability of the innocent infringer defense to P2P is the next 
logical step in a litigation strategy dating back to A&M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc.16
Part I of this Note examines the development and legislative history of 
innocent infringement in American copyright law.  Part II discusses P2P 
downloading as a backdrop for copyright infringement, the difficulties it 
presents, and the Recording Industry Association of America’s (RIAA) 
 
 
 7. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2006); Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory 
Damages in Copyright Law:  A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 
452–53 (2009) (examining the statutory damages provision for copyright infringement and 
noting that the innocent infringer provision was an attempt by Congress to limit statutory 
damages). 
 8. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). 
 9. See, e.g., Harper, 598 F.3d at 194–95 (noting that computer forensic evidence 
originally discovered 544 audio files, which were subsequently deleted, and then an 
additional cache of 700 files; plaintiffs, however, only sought recovery on thirty-seven audio 
files); Gonzalez, 430 F.3d at 889–90 (explaining that originally 1,370 copyrighted files were 
found but, due to a dispute over which songs the defendant had purchased on CDs before the 
downloads and which she bought after, the action only focused on thirty undisputed 
infringing acts). 
 10. See infra notes 188–92, 211–15 and accompanying text. 
 11. 17 U.S.C. § 402(d). 
 12. See infra Part I. 
 13. See infra Part II.A. 
 14. See infra notes 179, 196–205 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra notes 124–33 and accompanying text. 
 16. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding Napster guilty of contributory infringement); 
see infra Part II.B.   
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litigation strategy against both direct and indirect infringers.  Part III 
analyzes the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ denial of the innocent infringer 
defense in a P2P setting—citing § 402(d)—as well as various critiques of 
those opinions.  Lastly, Part IV argues against those circuits’ reasoning and 
for a more practical interpretation of “access” that will account for both the 
realities of the digital age and the legislative intent behind § 402(d). 
I.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF INNOCENT INFRINGEMENT 
This part examines the history of innocent infringement in American 
copyright law.  First, it explores the period from America’s first copyright 
statute in 1790 until its initial overhaul in 1909, which was characterized by 
a high level of protection for innocent infringers.  It then analyzes the 
period from 1909 onward, highlighted by the 1976 revisions that contain 
the modern statutory damage and innocent infringement provisions.  Lastly, 
it introduces a Second Circuit decision as an example of innocent 
infringement mitigation. 
A.  The Roots of Innocent Infringement 
Like most of the American legal system, copyright law traces its roots to 
England.  Passed in 1709, the Statute of Anne17 was the first British 
copyright legislation.18  Written for the “Encouragement of learned Men to 
compose and write useful Books,” the Statute of Anne imposed a penalty of 
one penny per sheet of copyrighted material found in an infringer’s 
possession.19  Thus, the first Anglo-American copyright law operated under 
a statutory damage system, rather than requiring the copyright holder to 
prove actual or punitive damages.20
Warning that “many Persons may through Ignorance offend this Act,” the 
statute contained an express concern for innocent infringers.
 
21  A 
registration system was designed whereby liability would not attach to 
those who printed their own copies of a protected work “unless the Title to 
the Copy of such Book or Books hereafter published [was] . . . entred [sic] 
in the Register Book of the Company of Stationers.”22  The hope was that 
such a system would lower the risk of innocent infringement by logging 
every copyrighted work into a central record.23
 
 17. 8 Ann., c. 21 (1709) (Eng.). 
 
 18. See R. Anthony Reese, Innocent Infringement in U.S. Copyright Law:  A History, 30 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 133, 136 (2007) (discussing the 1790 Copyright Act’s similarities to the 
Statute of Anne). 
 19. Statute of Anne § 1.  
 20. See id.; 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT               
§ 14.01–.04 (2009) (discussing the differences between actual, punitive, and statutory 
damages for an act of copyright infringement). 
 21. Statute of Anne § 2; see Reese, supra note 18, at 145–46 (discussing the Statute of 
Anne’s concern with innocent infringement and the development of the registration system 
as a means of protection against such a risk). 
 22. Statute of Anne § 2. 
 23. See Reese, supra note 18, at 146 (“Having seen the risk of innocent offense, the 
drafters attempted to reduce this risk through a registration system.”). 
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With regard to the sale of infringing works, the statute applied only to 
those individuals who “knowing the same to be so printed or 
reprinted . . . sell publish or expose to Sale” any book.24
America did not establish a federal copyright law until 1790.
  While the act 
essentially imputed constructive knowledge of the registry on printers, the 
above provision demonstrates that early British lawmakers were concerned 
with innocent infringement, specifically the unknowing sale of infringing 
merchandise. 
25  
Previously, copyright enforcement occurred at the state level, except in 
Delaware, which had no copyright statute.26  Similar to the Statute of Anne, 
the 1790 Act allowed for statutory damages at a rate of fifty cents per sheet 
for any copyrighted material found in an infringer’s possession.27
Knowledge was a crucial element of early American copyright 
infringement.
 
28
shall print, reprint, publish, or import . . . any copy or copies of such map, 
chart, book or books, without the consent of the author or proprietor 
thereof . . . ; or knowing the same to be so printed, reprinted, or imported, 
shall publish, sell, or expose to sale . . . any copy of such map, chart, book 
or books, without such consent . . . .
  The 1790 Act imposed liability only on those individuals 
who 
29
Thus, the law provided the same distinction as the Statute of Anne between 
printing an infringing copy and selling such a copy.  The inclusion of a 
knowledge requirement appears to be a purposeful safeguard for innocent 
infringers, as the 1790 Patent Act imposed liability even on unknowing 
infringers.
 
30  As copyright law slowly grew to protect more types of works, 
Congress “took care to preserve the distinction between types of 
infringement and to require knowledge on the part of a seller of 
unauthorized copies.”31  Although the knowledge requirement was 
ultimately abandoned in 1909,32
 
 24. Statute of Anne § 1. 
 the retention of this mens rea element of 
 25. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831); see Stephanie Berg, 
Remedying the Statutory Damages Remedy for Secondary Copyright Infringement Liability:  
Balancing Copyright and Innovation in the Digital Age, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 265, 
274–75 (2009) (discussing the circumstances surrounding Congress’s adoption of the 
original federal copyright act). 
 26. See, e.g., Matt Jackson, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back:  An Historical Analysis 
of Copyright Liability, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 367, 378 (2002) (further noting that 
among these twelve, four states did not distinguish innocent from willful infringement). 
 27. Act of May 31, 1790 § 2, 1 Stat. at 124–25. 
 28. Reese, supra note 18, at 178–79 (stating that the 1909 Copyright Act “abandoned the 
basic structure of all prior U.S. copyright law that required knowing action for certain acts to 
constitute infringement”). 
 29. Act of May 31, 1790 § 2, 1 Stat. at 124–25. 
 30. The text of the 1790 Patent Act made no reference to any knowledge on the part of 
the infringer, but rather imposed liability on any person who “shall devise, make, construct, 
use, employ, or vend” any patented product within the United States. 1790 Patent Act, ch. 7, 
§ 4, 1 Stat. 109, 111. 
 31. Reese, supra note 18, at 156. 
 32. See infra Part I.B.2.  
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copyright infringement for over 100 years demonstrates a deep-seated 
concern for innocent infringement. 
Another similarity with the Statute of Anne came in the form of a 
registration component.33  The 1790 Act system mandated that all 
copyrighted works be recorded in the clerk’s office of the district court in 
which the author resided.34  In 1802, Congress mandated that protection 
would only be granted to those holders who placed “the copy of the record, 
which, by said act he is required to publish in one or more of the 
newspapers, to be inserted at full length in the title-page or in the page 
immediately following the title of every such book or books.”35  This notice 
provision reduced the risks of innocent infringement more so than the 
previous incarnation of the Act, given its convenience over checking each 
district court’s records.36  This would prove to be the nineteenth century’s 
most substantive change to the copyright law with respect to innocent 
infringement.37
In 1909, the law experienced a comprehensive overhaul, becoming broad 
enough to cover a variety of works and recognizing the growing landscape 
of copyright protection.
 
38  An examination of the legislative history behind 
the 1909 Act provides an interesting picture into the drafters’ views on 
innocent infringement.39
B.  Copyright Law Developments in the Twentieth Century 
 
1.  The Legislative History of the Copyright Act of 1909 
In response to the Senate Committee on Patents’ desire to overhaul the 
copyright regime, the Librarian of Congress called a conference in 1905.40
 
 33. See supra notes 
  
A survey of the debates demonstrates that innocent infringement was a 
legitimate concern of the time. 
21–23 and accompanying text. 
 34. See Act of May 31, 1790 § 3, 1 Stat. at 125. 
 35. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 1, 2 Stat. 171, 171 (repealed 1831). 
 36. See Reese, supra note 18, at 151–52.  The notice requirement ensured that “none 
could offend ignorantly.  [Publication of notice in a newspaper] was mere legal implied 
notice; [publication of notice on every printed copy of a work] was a notice in fact, which no 
man could either overlook or mistake.” Id. (citing Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 
698 (1834) (Baldwin, J., dissenting)). 
 37. See Reese, supra note 18, at 150–51 (discussing the origins of the notice requirement 
and its effect of “obviously provid[ing] significantly greater protection for possible 
unknowing infringers than did the formalities of the original 1790 Act or the Statute of 
Anne”). 
 38. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 5, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076, repealed by Copyright Act of 
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541; see Reese, supra note 18, at 175 (noting that the 
landscape the 1909 copyright system operated in was “radically different[]” than at the time 
of the 1790 Act). 
 39. Jackson, supra note 26, at 379–84. See generally 1–2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
1909 COPYRIGHT ACT (E. Fulton Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds., 1976) [hereinafter 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].  
 40. See 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 39, pt. C, at vii.  
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As the conference began, lawmakers categorized infringers into certain 
groups based on their relevant intent.41  Among these, they distinguished 
between “the mere pirate” who “would not be [represented at] . . . your 
hearings” and “the innocent reproducer [who would not be] unrepresented 
at the conferences or in the discussions.”42  With innocent infringers noted 
as a group deserving consideration, the debates proceeded.43
Notes from the debates evidence a general concern over knowing versus 
innocent violations.  The comments of Robert Underwood Johnson, 
Secretary of the American (Authors’) Copyright League, are especially 
telling of this sentiment: 
 
 I hope in the new draft [of the Copyright Act] there will be, as far as 
possible, a careful discrimination between malicious infringement and 
innocent infringement.  Those who innocently infringe a copyright are 
exposed to enormous penalties under the present draft.  These penalties 
ought not to be imposed for innocent infringement.44
 Much of the discussion concerning innocent infringement was, as it is 
today,
 
45 tied to the notice requirement.46  The final draft of the 1909 Act 
contained a provision stating that the lack of notice, while not voiding 
protection for the holder altogether, would “prevent the recovery of 
damages against an innocent infringer who has been misled by the omission 
of the notice.”47
 
 41. See Berg, supra note 
  While innocent infringement remained a powerful 
protection, this change constrained it to instances in which a copy without 
the proper notice had misled the infringer and only provided the violator 
with relief from damages. 
25, at 278–79. 
 42. 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 39, pt. H, at 17 (demonstrating intent to include 
the views of the latter). 
 43. See id. 
 44. 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 39, pt. D, at 258 (demonstrating that excessive 
damage awards against innocent infringers were a concern at the time of drafting).  The 
converse of the innocent infringer provision is the knowing/willful infringement provision.  
The current version was enacted in 1976 and states that when “the copyright owner sustains 
the burden of proving, and the court finds, that the infringement was committed willfully, the 
court in its discretion may increase the award . . . to a sum of not more than $150,000.” 17 
U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006); see Berg, supra note 25, at 299–300 (discussing the original 
enactment of the 1976 statutory damage provisions).  It is also important to note that the 
burden of proof for willful infringement is on the holder of the copyright, while the burden 
of proof for innocent infringement is on the infringer. See § 504(c)(2). 
 45. See infra notes 189–94 and accompanying text. 
 46. The rationale behind § 20 of the 1909 Act appears, at a glance, to be extremely 
relevant to the controversy over music downloads where copyright notice is affixed to 
physical CDs, but never to the digital music file themselves.  This is further evidenced by 
remarks concerning the clause at the 1909 debates: 
  The last paragraph [which would become § 20] has been to some extent already 
discussed.  The failure, owing to accident or mistake, to give the prescribed notice 
on a particular copy or copies does not, under the provisions of this bill, invalidate 
the copyright, but it does provide that if anyone is misled by the failure to give the 
notice in a copy and innocently infringes, there shall be no recovery of damages 
against such infringer for what he innocently did . . . . 
6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 39, pt. N, at 13. 
 47. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 20, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080, repealed by Copyright Act 
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541. 
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Thus, the debates leading up to the 1909 Copyright Act demonstrate a 
respect for, and intention to protect the rights of, innocent infringers.48
2.  The 1909 Provisions:  Abandonment of the Knowledge Requirement 
and Effect of Relief Provisions 
 
Of all the new components of the Copyright Act of 1909, the omission of 
the knowledge requirement appears to be the most relevant to the innocent 
infringement discussion.49  The Act operated by enumerating certain 
exclusive rights owed to a copyright holder,50 but “never expressly defined 
infringement and articulated no knowledge or mental-state requirement for 
any violations.”51  Pursuant to this structure, courts have generally refrained 
from inquiring into a defendant’s state of mind in their determinations of 
infringement since the 1909 Act.52
With the knowledge requirement extinguished, the only protection for 
innocent infringers was a limitation on the copyright holder’s recovery.
 
53  
However, the Act did provide that “in a suit for infringement no permanent 
injunction shall be had unless the copyright proprietor shall reimburse to the 
innocent infringer his reasonable outlay innocently incurred if the court, in 
its discretion, shall so direct.”54  Reimbursing innocent infringers for their 
own labor added a level of protection for those who may have invested 
substantially in their reproductions of a copyrighted work.55  Nevertheless, 
the statute did not excuse the infringer of liability for profits from the 
reproductions.56
The years between the 1909 Act and the next major overhaul in 1976 
were marked by two additional protections for innocent infringers.  When 
Congress extended copyright protection to motion pictures in 1912, it 
provided that statutory damages made “in lieu of actual damages” would be 
 
 
 48. Due to the practicalities of technology of that time, this was a concern with 
commercial reproductions, as infringement on a small scale or personal level was 
impractical. See infra Part II.A.  The remarks of W.A. Livingstone, President, Print 
Publishers’ Association of America, at the Conference are especially telling:  “I wish to 
point out further that there is no way in which you can frame that provision regarding the 
notice, so that you will prevent all cases of innocent infringement . . . .  We cannot excape 
[sic] some of these troubles.” 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 40, pt. E, at 291. 
 49. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text. 
 50. Section 1 of the Act lists the rights of a copyright holder, while § 5 lists the types of 
works covered under the Act. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909 §§ 1, 5, 35 Stat. at 1075–77. 
 51. Reese, supra note 18, at 179; see Jackson, supra note 26, at 381–82 (discussing the 
general strict liability structure used in the 1909 Act). 
 52. Courts do, however, inquire into a defendant’s mental state when determining the 
good faith standards of the “fair use” defense. See infra note 182 and accompanying text. 
 53. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text. 
 54. Act of Mar. 4, 1909 § 20, 35 Stat. at 1080. 
 55. See Reese, supra note 18, at 180 (noting the protective nature, but also warning that 
the “requirement for reimbursement by the copyright owner was left to the discretion of the 
court”). 
 56. See ARTHUR W. WEIL, AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW:  WITH ESPECIAL REFERENCE TO 
THE PRESENT UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT ACT 354 (1917) (noting that, under the 1909 
statutory scheme, the “profits made by an innocent infringer may be recovered,” which was 
“required by the language of the Act and to be sound, from a technical point of view”). 
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limited to $100 when the infringer “was not aware that he was infringing, 
and that such infringement could not have been reasonably foreseen.”57  In 
1952, Congress provided an innocent infringer exception for broadcasters 
who infringed on non-dramatic literary works—which were granted 
protection in the same amendment—when it could be shown that the 
broadcaster was not aware that they were infringing.58
3.  The 1976 Act:  Start of the Modern Scheme 
 
With hopes of modernizing the copyright system, the statute was 
amended again in 1976.59  The Copyright Office of the Library of Congress 
began a series of studies on the current state of the law in 1955 that resulted 
in the 1976 revision.60  When discussions began, a major topic was the 
notice requirement, which Congress had begun to “liberalize” in 1909.61
Notice had originally been one of the chief protections for innocent 
infringers,
 
62
general postulates underlying the provision are that a person acting in 
good faith and with no reason to think otherwise should ordinarily be able 
to assume that a work is in the public domain if there is no notice on an 
authorized copy or phonorecord and that, if he relies on this assumption, 
he should be shielded from unreasonable liability.
 and that practical benefit was still apparent at the time of the 
1976 Act.  The House Reports on the 1976 Act demonstrate the importance 
that the notice requirement had for the innocent infringer, stating that the: 
63
The 1976 Act ultimately retained the notice requirement, although it   
further relaxed its terms.
 
64  It also retained the clause protecting those who 
were misled by an omission of notice, providing for “no liability for actual 
or statutory damages.”65
 
 57. Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, § 25(b), 37 Stat. 488, 489 (repealed 1976); see 
Jackson, supra note 
 
26, at 383 (discussing the 1912 and 1952 innocent infringer amendments 
and noting that the justification for the filmmaker provision was possibly due to the 
“frequency of exhibition”). 
 58. Act of July 17, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-575, 66 Stat. 752 (repealed 1976).  The concept 
of affording special protection to public broadcasters was something that was retained in the 
1976 revision. See infra notes 72–75 and accompanying text. 
 59. See Berg, supra note 25, at 300; see also Jackson, supra note 57, at 383–90 
(surveying the early history surrounding the 1976 revisions and noting that innocent 
infringement was a concern from the revisions’ start in 1955). 
 60. See, e.g., WILLIAM S. STRAUSS, STUDY NO. 22:  THE DAMAGE PROVISIONS OF THE 
COPYRIGHT LAW (Oct. 1956), reprinted in 2 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY ix–32 (George S. Grossman ed., 2001). 
 61. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.   
 62. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
 63. H.R. REP. NO.  94-1476, at 148 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5764. 
 64. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-533, §§ 405, 406, 90 Stat. 2541, 2578–79 
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 405, 406 (2006)); see also Reese, supra note 18, at 176–77 
(discussing the relaxation of the notice requirement, in terms of form, placement, and errors, 
and its subsequent effect on innocent infringement). 
 65. In terms of injunctive relief, the Act also authorized a court to allow the infringer to 
continue after the infringer had paid a reasonable license fee to the holder of the copyright. 
Copyright Act of 1976 § 405(b). 
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 The notice provision was completely eliminated in 1988 when the United 
States joined the Berne Convention,66 but Congress sought to retain an 
incentive for holders to still attach notice to their works, by enacting 
§ 402(d).67  This new section provided that “[i]f a notice of copyright . . . 
appears on the published phonorecord . . . to which a defendant in a 
copyright infringement suit had access, then no weight shall be given to 
such a defendant’s interposition of a defense based on innocent 
infringement in mitigation of actual or statutory damages.”68  In light of the 
fact that copyright holders today enjoy a larger bundle of rights than in 
previous incarnations of the regime, the abandonment of the notice 
requirement proved to be a major blow to innocent infringer protection.69
 The 1976 Act also introduced the modern statutory damage system, 
which includes the innocent infringement clause.
   
70  Innocent infringement 
applies when an infringer “was not aware and had no reason to believe that 
his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright,” and allows a court 
to reduce the award of statutory damages to $200 per act.71  At the debates 
on the proposed amendments, representatives of the broadcasting and 
educational industries had argued that damages should be completely set 
aside in cases of “genuinely innocent infringement” unless actual damage 
could be shown.72  Section 504(c)(2) was meant to be a compromise 
between those two groups and others who advocated for stronger penalties 
for innocent infringers.73  The Act’s drafters originally understood this 
provision as “sufficient [enough] to protect against unwarranted liability in 
cases of occasional or isolated innocent infringement.”74
 
 66. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, §7, 102 
Stat. 2853, 2857–59 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.)  The Berne 
Convention was an international agreement primarily designed to provide reciprocal 
recognition of signatory countries’ copyright structures. 
  Congress 
 67. See 17 U.S.C. § 402(d); 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 20, § 7.02(C)(3) (stating 
that while “notice [was] no longer required at publication . . . [an] incentive for use of the 
same type of copyright notice” was created in § 402(d)). 
 68. § 402(d). 
 69. See Reese, supra note 18, at 178 (“The early constructive notice approach to 
enabling users to avoid infringing depended on a relatively clear demarcation between a 
copyright owner’s exclusive rights and uses of a work that did not infringe.  Today, thoughs 
[sic] most noninfringing uses of copyrighted works are those allowed under significantly 
indeterminate doctrines . . . [one] who wants to use a work without infringing must 
determine not only whether the work is copyright but, more importantly, whether the use is 
permissible.”). 
 70. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). 
 71. Id. § 504(c)(2). 
 72. See CAMBRIDGE RESEARCH INST., OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION:  COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES 145 (1973); Berg, supra note 25, at 298–99 (discussing the 
concerns about innocent infringement, as well as those about new technologies, at the 
debates). 
 73. See CAMBRIDGE RESEARCH INST., supra note 72, at 145; Jackson, supra note 26, at 
384–86  (summarizing both sides’ arguments in the original innocent infringer debate). 
 74. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 163 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5779; 
see also Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 7, at 460 (discussing the tripartite system of 
statutory damages in general, namely standard, innocent, and willful infringement). 
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ultimately sided with broadcasters and educators, however; the latter 
portion of § 504(c)(2) provides: 
[t]he court shall remit statutory damages in any case where an infringer 
believed and had reasonable grounds for believing that his or her use of 
the copyrighted work was a fair use under section 107, if the infringer 
was:  (i) an employee or agent of a nonprofit educational institution . . . or 
(ii) a public broadcasting entity. . . .75
The retention of a damage floor generally—as opposed to the specific 
remittance of damages afforded innocent educators and broadcasters—was 
intended to preserve a deterrent effect, as it would not allow an infringer to 
escape liability simply because the holder could not disprove a claim of 
innocence.
 
76
 In contrast to the notice requirement, the statutory damages innocent 
infringement provision has largely remained untouched since its 
inception.
 
77  While the statutory minimum for innocent infringement 
increased from $100 to $200 with the adoption of the Berne Convention,78 
it has otherwise remained consistent despite subsequent changes to the 
copyright law to reflect the growing digital environment.79
C.  A Modern Example of Innocent Infringement in the Courts 
 
An analysis of the Second Circuit’s opinion in D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Mini 
Gift Shop80 provides a typical example of innocent infringement mitigation 
of a statutory damage award.81  The infringers there were a number of 
recent immigrants who maintained several shops in and around New York 
City.82  At these establishments, the defendants sold various pieces of 
merchandise that infringed on the Batman license.83  The time of the 
infringement coincided with the release of Tim Burton’s film of the same 
name.84  The plaintiff, Warner Brothers, Inc., owned the Batman mark and 
various licenses through its subsidiaries.85
 
 75. § 504(c)(2). 
  Throughout the course of 
litigation, plaintiffs elected to receive statutory damages under § 504 (c)(1) 
 76. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 163, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5779. 
 77. The lack of change in terms of statutory damages stands in contrast with the 
technological world, which has been radically altered since the time of the 1976 Act. See 
infra Part II.A. 
 78. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
 79. Compare § 504 (current version), with Copyright Act of 1976 § 504, Pub. L. No. 94-
533, 90 Stat. 2541, 2585–86 (original).  The Digital Millennium Copyright Act was the 
largest revision of copyright law since the 1976 Act, but made no modifications to the 
innocent infringement protections found in 17 USC § 504(c)(2). See Pub. L. No. 105-304, 
§1, 112 Stat. 2860; DAVID NIMMER, COPYRIGHT:  SACRED TEXT, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE 
DMCA 385 (2003). 
 80. 912 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 81. See id. at 36. 
 82. Id. at 31–32. 
 83. Id. at 31. 
 84. Id.; see also BATMAN, supra note 2. 
 85. D.C. Comics, 912 F.2d at 31. 
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of the Copyright Act and the defendants sought mitigation via 
§ 504(c)(2).86
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted 
mitigation to both those defendants who had appeared at trial and those who 
defaulted.
 
87  Plaintiffs appealed the judgment, claiming that granting 
reduced statutory damages was improper for both sets of defendants.88  The 
Second Circuit held that the district court’s extension of the innocent 
infringer defense to the defaulting defendants was unwarranted because the 
burden of proof rests on a defendant, and therefore increased their damage 
penalty to the contemporary minimum of $500 per act.89
It was the Second Circuit’s discussion of the appearing defendants, 
however, that is significant to the innocent infringement debate.  The court 
began by noting that the goods themselves carried no copyright notice and 
were, to a layperson, virtually indistinguishable from non-infringing 
merchandise.
 
90  The simple absence of the appropriate notice, however, is 
not enough to establish innocent infringement if the defendant had “reason 
to believe” the merchandise was copyrighted.91
Judge Roger J. Miner adopted the paradigmatic understanding of 
§ 504(c)(2) that an “inquiry into the defendant’s state of mind” is crucial 
when considering mitigation.
 
92  Relying on transcripts from trial 
appearances that clearly demonstrated the defendants’ lack of business 
sophistication, the court determined that a defendant’s inexperience was “an 
entirely proper means of determining whether or not his infringement was 
innocent.”93 Such a lack of sophistication added weight to the fact that there 
was no copyright notice on the infringing goods and, therefore, the Second 
Circuit held that the defendants deserved damage mitigation as innocent 
infringers.94
 
 86. Id. at 35 (discussing a number of defendants in this litigation who failed to appear 
before the district court). 
  Moreover, the shop owner’s lack of sophistication and the 
appearance of the goods provided justification for their failure to “inquire as 
 87. Id. at 31. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 35 (stating that the court simply “could not make any finding of innocence 
concerning the defendants who failed to appear”). 
 90. Id. (“[T]here were no copyright notices on the infringing goods and . . . a layman 
would not be able to distinguish between licensed and unlicensed goods . . . .  This evidence 
tends to establish that defendants’ infringement was innocent.”).  In this regard, the goods in 
question were similar to a song downloaded through a P2P network. See infra note 297 and 
accompanying text. 
 91. D.C. Comics, 912 F.2d at 35. 
 92. Id. at 35.  Furthermore, it is important to note that the “defense” of innocent 
infringement never absolves liability but merely reduces an award for statutory damages. See 
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2)(2006). 
 93. D.C. Comics, 912 F.2d at 35–36 (remarking that the defendants “lacked ‘the 
sophistication or level of understanding’ to prompt an inquiry into the source of the 
unmarked goods”).  Generally, experience can give rise to a duty of inquiry. See Little Mole 
Music v. Spike Inv., Inc., 720 F. Supp. 751, 755 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (holding that the 
defendant, an experienced jukebox operation, “should” have inquired into the copyrighted 
nature of the copyrighted music). 
 94. D.C. Comics, 912 F.2d at 36. 
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to the source of the goods,” which may have uncovered their copyrighted 
nature.95  The shop owners were ultimately deemed innocent infringers and 
their judgment against them was mitigated to $200 per act.96
This application of the innocent infringement provision, as well as 
statutory damage system in general, has remained nearly untouched since 
its inception in 1976,
 
97
II.  THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION:  THE EFFECT OF P2P DOWNLOADING 
ON COPYRIGHT LAW AND PERSONAL USE 
 but the landscape in which copyright infringement 
may take place has experienced an extraordinary transformation. 
This part focuses on the history of P2P downloading.  It begins by 
examining the radically different landscape in which copyright infringement 
now exists:  the digital arena.  It then analyzes the RIAA’s98
A.  Comparison to Infringement in the Analog World 
 litigation 
strategy against P2P services that were used for illegal downloading 
(indirect infringers).  Lastly, this part presents the circumstances that 
ultimately led the RIAA to bring claims against individuals who had 
downloaded music files from P2P networks (end-users). 
 It has been suggested that copyright infringement in the digital era 
presents several “distinct problems” when applied to the current, pre-digital 
statutory regime.99 This is of no surprise, as copyright law developed 
around large scale “means for mechanically capturing and reproducing 
works of authorship . . . and new devices and methods for distributing, 
receiving, and perceiving [such] content.”100
 
 95. Id.; see also Dolori Fabrics, Inc. v. Limited, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 1347, 1354 (S.D.N.Y. 
1987) (finding that a dress supplier’s failure to undertake a copyright search was not enough 
to find her infringement intentional because she had no notice that the pattern was 
trademarked and had not dealt with the plaintiff prior to the suit).  It is important to note that 
this conclusion that there was no duty to inquire is the exact opposite of that in BMG Music 
v. Gonzalez where the defendant similarly lacked legal sophistication. See infra notes 
 Such a system contrasts 
sharply with the infringement examined in this Note, which is limited to 
digital downloading, mainly from P2P networks.  
191–
94 and accompanying text. 
 96. D.C. Comics, 912 F.2d at 37. 
 97. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 98. The RIAA is a trade organization whose members account for the creation, 
manufacture, and/or distribution of 85 percent of the music produced in the United States. 
See Who We Are, RIAA, http://www.riaa.com/aboutus.php (last visited Nov. 16, 2011).   
 99. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 171–72 (2001); see infra Part III.B.i 
(discussing various alternative proposals to the current copyright scheme that would account 
for the realities of the digital environment). 
 100. Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 63, 104 (2003) (giving examples such as “phonographs, photographs, film, and 
photocopies”).  Furthermore, the very term “analog” derives from a mechanical reproduction 
that operates as an “analogy” to the original work. Id. 
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In general, a P2P network allows individuals to locate and download files 
from another person’s computer over an internet connection.101  Such a file-
sharing system can enable an “unauthorized transfer” of copyrighted music 
files—such as MP3 files—that can be “ripped” from CDs onto a 
computer.102  Widespread dissemination is one of the most remarkable 
advances that characterize the digital era.103  Scholars warn that as the costs 
of producing copies dramatically falls, “the sharp division between 
professional counterfeiters and end-user copiers breaks down.”104  This 
situation is exacerbated by the pure ease of digital copying compared to 
physical photocopying or “taping” in the analog era.105
Aside from physical differences, the instant accessibility of a seemingly 
endless amount of information has created new “end user [societal] 
norms.”
 
106  A “norm” is a pattern of behavior whose context is defined not 
by statutory constraints, but rather through popular practice.107  The 
examination of popular practice is crucial to the P2P discussion because 
copyright law is not a natural predisposition of Anglo-American culture.108  
Gaps often exist between the actual law and typical activity.109  Studies 
have shown this to be a product of the public’s understanding of copyright 
as a “mind-numbing collection of inconsistent, indeed incoherent, 
complexities.”110
 
 101. See MICHAEL A. EINHORN, MEDIA, TECHNOLOGY, AND COPYRIGHT:  INTEGRATING 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 79 (2004). 
  Other possible causes for such gaps include 
exaggerations over a copyright holder’s rights, confusion over the role of 
 102. Id. 
 103. See Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement 
Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1374–75 (2004); see also Ann 
Bartow, Electrifying Copyright Norms and Making Cyberspace More like a Book, 48 VILL. 
L. REV. 13, 17 (2003) (discussing how technological advances have, among other things, led 
to greater ease in distribution of copyrighted works); Menell, supra note 100, at 103 (“[T]he 
ease with which digital technology enables anyone . . . to reproduce and make 
available . . . flawless reproductions of works of authorship has proven a far greater concern 
and more wrenching adjustment for copyright law than accommodating computer 
software.”). 
 104. Lemley & Reese, supra note 103, at 1375.  Phrased otherwise, almost everyone 
today has the means by which to commit certain types of infringement that would be limited 
to only professional counterfeiters in the analog era. Id. 
 105. Id. (noting that copying a CD for someone deprives the record company of a single 
sale, while posting the files from that same CD online risks depriving the record company of 
thousands of sales). 
 106. Bartow, supra note 103, at 19–20. 
 107. Id. at 20–21 (citing Steven Hetcher, Norm Proselytizers Create a Privacy 
Entitlement in Cyberspace, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877, 892 n.53 (2001)). 
 108. Id. at 23. 
 109. See id. at 43–44 (describing the “gap-creating” nature of copyright law). 
 110. Jessica Litman, Copyright as Myth, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 235, 237 (1991); see also 
Bartow, supra note 103, at 44 (noting that the public is often “better versed in copyright 
myths and urban legends than in actual copyright law”).  These complexities, and their 
relation to norm-gaps, have led the National Research Council to recommend that the digital 
age requires a re-working of copyright law in favor of “a greater degree of simplicity, clarity, 
straight-forwardness, and easy comprehensibility” with “sufficient flexibility and 
adaptability in the law so it can accommodate the future evolution of technologies and 
behaviors.” NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA:  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
THE INFORMATION AGE 127 (2000). 
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publishers and record companies, and the relative ease by which copyright 
protection can be established in the first place.111
The transition from an analog to digital world dramatically altered 
concepts of typical personal use.  In the analog world,
 
112 music could be 
shared among individuals “without any copying across formats.”113  The 
“norm” for similar use in the digital world is fundamentally different 
because “sharing [MP3 files] as conveniently as tapes or CDs functionally 
requires making copies.”114  This is crucial in the P2P setting because 
studies have shown that teenagers, despite the threat of litigation, consider 
P2P networks the most attractive source of obtaining music.115
The simple act of copying a music file has conflicting legal consequences 
depending on its analog or digital nature.  The Audio Home Recording Act 
of 1992
 
116 allows the copying—for non-profit use117—of a song to share 
with others so long as that copying is done by analog means.  The use of a 
P2P network for achieving the exact same purpose, however, has been held 
to violate the copyright law.118  Some argue that this fundamental 
difference creates confusion over what the public considers to be a non-
infringing activity.119
The extraordinary aspect of digital downloading is that despite the 
RIAA’s legal victories, the popularity of P2P continues to rise.
 
120  The 
latest generation of P2P downloading, which operates largely through the 
use of torrent files,121 accounts for over half of the total upload traffic in 
North America and 13.2 percent of the downloading traffic.122  While 
legitimate internet media services, such as Netflix, have grown at 
exponential rates, P2P remains a major aspect of cyber-culture.123
 
 111. See Bartow, supra note 
 
103, at 46–48 (using the example of the strong language 
found in “FBI notice[s]” on videotapes and DVDs). 
 112. The analog era of music was characterized by records, cassette tapes, and compact 
discs as the primary means by which individuals purchased—and infringed—a musical 
work. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 113. Bartow, supra note 103, at 22. 
 114. Id. (noting that the alternative, lending an MP3 file as one would a CD, is 
impractical because it would require the additional lending of a computer or MP3 player). 
 115. See Menell, supra note 100, at 101. 
 116. 17 U.S.C. § 1008; see Bartow, supra note 103, at 31 (stating that the Act “de facto 
legitimized” such analog copying). 
 117. Academics such as Jessica Litman have argued for the non-profit distinction as an 
alternative solution to the P2P crisis. See LITMAN, supra note 99, at 171–91. 
 118. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020–22 (9th Cir. 
2001) (holding Napster liable on a contributory infringement theory). 
 119. See Bartow, supra note 103, at 43–48 (discussing the phenomenon of “norm gaps” 
in copyright law). 
 120. See Menell, supra note 100, at 101. 
 121. Torrent files contain URLs of various “trackers.”  An end-user who downloads from 
a torrent receives pieces of data from multiple users, which the torrent file organizes into a 
comprehensive whole. See, e.g., The BitTorrent Protocol Specification, BITTORRENT.ORG, 
http://www.bittorrent.org/beps/bep_0003.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2011). 
 122. BitTorrent Still Dominates Global Internet Traffic, TORRENT FREAK (Oct. 26, 2010), 
http://torrentfreak.com/bittorrent-still-dominates-global-internet-traffic-101026/. 
 123. Thomas Mennecke, The End of an Era—BitTorrent Challenged by Netflix, SLYCK 
(Oct. 26, 2010), http://www.slyck.com/story2106_The_End_of_an_Era_BitTorrent_
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P2P’s role as a societal norm is noteworthy as judicial opinions 
considering copyright law often involve an inquiry into the public’s use of a 
given procedure for making copies.124  For instance, one of the chief 
justifications for the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Sony Corp. 
of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.125—that the Betamax 
videocassette recorder (VCR) manufacturer was not liable for contributory 
infringement—was the fact that the public used the VCR in substantial, 
non-infringing ways.126  Today, P2P downloading is recognized as “illegal, 
but common,” even in the eyes of courts.127  This has led some to argue for 
a framework that would translate analog norms to their digital 
counterparts.128
[E]nd use purchasers customarily re-read analog books and loan them to 
friends. . . [and those rights should be protected] when the works are 
embodied in electronic formats . . . .  Conversely, [since] consumers do 
not typically destroy analog books nor rent them out for fees, it would be 
unnecessary to codify rights to do so specifically with electronic 
books.
  For example: 
129
While radical, this approach stresses the importance of societal norms in 
applying copyright law. 
 
Even the RIAA, the perennial “bad guy” in the public’s view of the P2P 
war, has admitted to the commonality of P2P downloading.130  In a recent 
interview, Cary Sherman, President of the RIAA, admitted that “most 
people had no idea that what they were doing was illegal, let alone thought 
it was wrong.”131  Some commentators, including famous P2P defendant 
Joel Tenenbaum,132 have noted that this seems to undermine the RIAA’s 
claim that these same defendants are undeserving of innocent infringement 
mitigation.133
Thus, there is a growing tension between the copyright laws and this 
fundamentally different arena in which digital downloading, and more 
specifically P2P network “sharing,” exists.  The next section explores 
 
 
Challenged_by_Netflix (noting that Netflix now accounts for over 20 percent of downstream 
internet content). 
 124. See generally Bartow, supra note 103 (discussing the importance that copyright 
norms have). 
 125. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 126. Id. at 451. 
 127. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1227–28 (D. Minn. 2008) 
(noting that the defendant “acted like countless other Internet users” when she downloaded 
music files from the P2P network KaZaA). 
 128. Bartow, supra note 103, at 75. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See Rocco Castoro, Downloading Some Bullshit:  An Interview with the President of 
the RIAA, VICE BETA (Aug. 20, 2010), http://www.vice.com/read/downloading-some-
bullshit-484-v17n8.  Sherman went on to say that despite the retention of public relations 
firms in an attempt to change the “culture” of digital downloading, the RIAA has come to 
realize that “none of the messages resonated.” Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See infra note 221 and accompanying text. 
 133. See RIAA President:  The Case for the Innocent Infringer, JOEL FIGHTS BACK (Aug. 
21, 2010), http://joelfightsback.com/#/2010/08/riaapresiden. 
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specific P2P systems and how the RIAA initiated their litigation campaign 
against file-sharing. 
B.  Early RIAA Litigation Strategy 
In 1999, a freshman at Northeastern University developed the original 
Napster application, setting the stage for the most infamous P2P decision to 
date.134  The system operated through a central server which was owned 
and maintained by Napster itself.135  User software was distributed through 
Napster’s website, which would access the server and locate “donor songs” 
that could then be downloaded.136  Napster’s servers, however, could not 
determine which file a user was searching for or whether the file was under 
copyright protection.137
Facing the variety of concerns discussed above, the RIAA initiated the 
first generation of P2P lawsuits against services, including Napster, whose 
central services maintained the files and processed the user requests.
 
138  
The RIAA’s claims at this stage were centered on a theory of indirect 
liability through contributory infringement.139  Contributory infringement, 
as opposed to direct infringement, exists when someone “with knowledge 
of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the 
infringing conduct of another.”140
Prior to Napster, the most significant contributory infringement decision 
was the Supreme Court’s opinion in Sony.
 
141
 
 134. See MATTHEW RIMMER, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT AND THE CONSUMER REVOLUTION:  
HANDS OFF MY IPOD 93 (2007). 
  That case focused on the 
legality of the VCR which, as a reproduction technology, had potentially 
 135. See id.; A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(describing the technical makeup of the Napster P2P system). See generally Ashley R. 
Hudson, Comment, Can’t Get No Satisfaction:  The Rise (and Fall?) of Grokster and Peer-
to-Peer File Sharing, 59 ARK. L. REV. 889, 899–902 (2007) (noting the technological 
distinction between Napster and Aimster in the historical development of P2P). 
 136. A “donor song” is merely a song, in a digital format, that an individual has made 
available on Napster’s server. See EINHORN, supra note 101, at 84. 
 137. See id.  Napster’s servers were, however, necessary for the system to survive in 
general, as opposed to those employed by Grokster and StreamCast. Jesse M. Feder, Is 
Betamax Obsolete?:  Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. in the Age of 
Napster, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 859, 883–84 (2004). 
 138. There were, as well, practical and economic reasons for the RIAA to attack 
facilitators before individual end-users. See Lemley & Reese, supra note 103, at 1349 
(“From the perspective of the music industry, it was easier and more effective to shut down 
Napster than to sue the millions of people who illegally traded files on Napster.”).  Other 
file-sharing systems, which were confronted with litigation at this phase, included Scour, 
Aimster/Madster, Audiogalaxy, and iMesh. See EINHORN, supra note 101, at 79. 
 139. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1011; see also Feder, supra note 137, at 869–73 (discussing 
the theories of indirect liability that characterized this stage in the RIAA’s litigation 
strategy). 
 140. Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d 
Cir. 1971). 
 141. See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 
(1984); Feder, supra note 137, at 879–902 (demonstrating the importance of Sony with 
regard to P2P litigation). 
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legitimate and illegitimate uses.142  Sony’s Betamax VCR was designed to 
allow consumers to make personal copies of television programs.143  
Universal and Disney filed their claim in 1976 alleging that Sony (not the 
consumers themselves) committed copyright infringement by virtue of 
manufacturing and producing VCRs.144  The U.S. District Court for the 
Central District of California denied any relief to the plaintiffs.145  On 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, held Sony liable for contributory 
infringement, and remanded proceedings to the district court to determine 
relief.146
After remand, the Supreme Court ultimately granted certiorari to review 
the judgment.  Justice John Paul Stevens produced one of the most powerful 
intellectual property opinions in the Court’s history.
 
147  The potential uses 
of the device served as the basis for the Court’s opinion.148  Since the VCR 
could be “widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes,” the Court 
held that the mere sale of it could not constitute contributory 
infringement.149  In addition, the Court made an important distinction 
between commercial and non-commercial uses of the VCR.150  Justice 
Stevens explained that “although every commercial use of copyrighted 
material is presumptively an unfair exploitation . . . [a] challenge to a 
noncommercial use of a copyrighted work requires proof either that the 
particular use is harmful, or that if it should become widespread, it would 
adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work.”151
 
 142. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 436–37. 
 
 143. See RIMMER, supra note 134, at 60 (discussing the technological significance of the 
VCR).  The Court’s opinion has been heralded by many academics, and the twenty-first 
anniversary of the opinion occasioned numerous tributes to it.  Gary Shapiro, Chairman of 
the Home Recording Rights Coalition, went as far as to call it the “Magna Carta” for the 
technological industry. Court Mulls File-Sharing Future, BBC NEWS (Mar. 30, 2005), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4394371.stm.  Sony is such an important precedent 
that almost all sixty briefs filed in relation to Metro-Goldwin-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster 
Ltd. at the Supreme Court level, regardless of which side they supported, cited to Sony. See 
News, ENJOY THE MUSIC (June 20, 2005), http://www.enjoythemusic.com/news/0605/ 
(discussing the continuing effect of the Sony decision in a digital environment). 
 144. See Jessica Litman, The Sony Paradox, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 917, 917–25 
(2005) (discussing the lead up to the Sony decision). 
 145. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 469 (C.D. 
Cal. 1979), rev’d, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 464 U.S. 417.  
 146. See Sony, 659 F.2d at 977. 
 147. See Pamela Samuelson, The Generativity of Sony v. Universal:  The Intellectual 
Property Legacy of Justice Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1831, 1875 (2006) (remarking that 
“[o]f the nearly fifty IP decisions rendered by the Supreme Court during the thirty years that 
Justice Stevens has served on the Court, none has had a more significant economic or social 
impact”); see also RIMMER, supra note 134, at 63, 65 (surveying the academic discourse on 
Justice Stevens’s majority opinion). 
 148. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 419–20. 
 149. Id. at 442.  The Court continued that “[i]ndeed, it need merely be capable of 
substantial noninfringing uses.” Id. 
 150. See id.; see also EINHORN, supra note 101, at 83 (discussing the Supreme Court’s use 
of the commercial versus noncommercial framework in relation to its holding). See generally 
LITMAN, supra note 99, at 171–86 (discussing the possible use of the commercial versus 
noncommercial distinction for P2P downloading). 
 151. Sony, 464 U.S. at 451. 
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With Sony as the seminal contributory infringement decision, the RIAA 
formulated their attack against P2P.   In December 1999, the RIAA filed a 
complaint against Napster for vicarious and contributory infringement.152  
One of Napster’s primary defenses was that Sony barred any finding of 
contributory infringement,153 because an MP3 file could be used as a 
“space-shifting” mechanism.154  This referred to instances in which a 
Napster user would merely download music that they already owned on a 
CD, thus “shifting” it from physical to digital form by way of Napster, as 
opposed to “ripping” the song from a physical CD.155  The Ninth Circuit 
refused to extend the shifting analysis, employed in both Sony and 
Recording Industry Association of America v. Diamond Multimedia 
Systems, Inc.,156 to Napster because the devices examined in those 
decisions “did not also simultaneously involve distribution of the 
copyrighted material to the general public.”157
Napster ultimately lost in the Ninth Circuit, scoring only a minor victory 
in the court’s recognition that record companies have the burden of giving 
Napster notice of copyrighted works on their service.
 
158  The RIAA used 
the momentum of its victory over Napster to attack similar P2P 
downloading services on the same contributory infringement theory.159
The next wave of litigation focused on P2P systems that stored files on 
random users’ computers, where others could send a file request through 
online directories for a given geographical region.
 
160  These new services 
were not only technologically distinct, but also attracted far more users than 
Napster did at its peak.161
 
 152. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900 (N.D. Cal. 2000), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).  Vicarious infringement is a 
concept related to respondeat superior, in which “a person who has promoted or induced the 
infringing acts . . . [is] jointly and severally liable as a ‘vicarious’ infringer.” See, e.g., 
Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 
1971). 
  In October 2001, companies in the music and 
 153. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019. 
 154. See id.  This argument is similar to the “time-shifting” aspect of the VCR in Sony. 
See Sony, 464 U.S. at 423. 
 155. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019. 
 156. 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that a “space-shift” to a personal MP3 
player was a fair use). 
 157. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019. 
 158. See id. at 1027; see also RIMMER, supra note 134, at 95. 
 159. See Hudson, supra note 135, at 902 (stating that the Grokster decision was brought 
“[o]n the heels of Napster II”); see also EINHORN, supra note 101, at 88 (noting that the 
parallel suits to Napster included claims against Audiogalaxy and Madster). 
 160. See Feder, supra note 137, at 865–66 (discussing the “supernode” model, as 
employed by Grokster, as compared to other types of P2P networks, such as Napster). 
 161. See John Borland, Suit Hits Popular Post-Napster Network, CNET NEWS (Oct. 3, 
2001), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-273855.html (discussing the popularity of second 
generation P2P sites).  In fact, the argument has been made that the defeat of Napster 
increased the general public’s awareness of illegal downloading on P2P networks and, 
ultimately, led to the rise in this generation’s downloading. See Kristina Groennings, Note, 
Costs and Benefits of the Recording Industry’s Litigation Against Individuals, 20 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 571, 573 (2005). 
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movie industries filed suit against the three most prominent of these 
networks:  KaZaA BV, Grokster, and Music City/StreamCast.162
The Central District of California originally granted summary judgment 
in favor of the P2P networks in Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer Studios v. Grokster, 
Ltd. in April 2003.
 
163  This was an unexpected conclusion given the 
outcome in Napster.164  The court held that the workings of StreamCast and 
Grokster were more analogous to the VCR examined in Sony165 than to 
Napster’s centralized system.166  In 2004, the Ninth Circuit upheld the 
verdict using a similar rationale of lack of user control.167  But the Supreme 
Court ultimately vacated that decision and remanded Grokster in 2005 to 
apply a new theory of “inducement.”168  Staying within the framework 
established by Sony, Justice David H. Souter articulated a concept of 
secondary liability for those “who distribute[] a device with the object of 
promoting its use to infringe copyright.”169
While the Supreme Court’s abrogation of the Central District of 
California and Ninth Circuit opinions left the door open to actions against 
services,
 
170
 
 162. See Rimmer, supra note 
 the lower courts’ earlier decisions had already forced copyright 
holders to pursue alternative strategies and had opened the floodgates to 
litigation against individual end-users, which caused the filing of lawsuits 
134, at 96.  KaZaA BV ultimately settled, but the KaZaA 
software had been sold to Sharman Networks, which therefore was still involved in the 
litigation at this stage. See EINHORN, supra note 101, at 88–91; Feder, supra note 137, at 
879–93 (surveying P2P litigation beginning with Napster and including the Grokster 
decision). 
 163. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 
1031 (C.D. Cal. 2003), aff’d, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated by 545 U.S. 913 
(2005). 
 164. See EINHORN, supra note 101, at 89; see also Hudson, supra note 135, at 906 (noting 
that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Grokster was a “stunning victory over the heavy hitters 
of the entertainment industry”). 
 165. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1043 (remarking that “[d]efendants distribute and 
support software, the users of which can and do choose to employ it for both lawful and 
unlawful ends”); see also EINHORN, supra note 101, at 89 (discussing the district court’s 
rationale in extending a Sony analysis to the P2P networks). 
 166. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1041 (noting that “[n]either StreamCast nor Grokster 
facilitates the exchange of files between users in the way Napster did); see Feder, supra note 
137, at 883–84 (discussing the technological differences between Napster and Grokster as an 
additional justification for the Ninth Circuit’s outcome in Grokster). 
 167. See Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1164; see also RIMMER, supra note 134, at 97–98 
(explaining that the Ninth Circuit decided that Grokster could not be held liable “because 
they could not police the conduct of their users, as Napster could”). 
 168. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 941.  After remand, Grokster reached a settlement with the 
RIAA, the terms of which included that a warning be posted on Grokster’s website stating 
the legality of their P2P network. See RIMMER, supra note 134, at 104. 
 169. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936–37 (continuing that the new rule “premises liability on 
purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and thus does nothing to compromise 
legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful promise”); see also Feder, 
supra note 137, at 881–84. 
 170. In the wake of Grokster, Sharman Networks, which had recently purchased KaZaA, 
settled, while StreamCast was found liable under the new theory of “inducement” at the 
district court level after remand. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 
454 F. Supp. 2d 966, 983–95 (C.D. Cal. 2006); RIMMER, supra note 134, at 104–05. 
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against 261 individual music downloaders on a single day.171  By 2008, the 
RIAA had sued over 30,000 individuals for copyright infringement 
stemming from digital downloading.172
III.  THE INNOCENT INFRINGEMENT DEBATE 
  While the vast majority of these 
claims have settled, the next part examines a mitigation defense that some 
of those defendants have attempted to employ. 
This part examines the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ recent jurisprudence 
on the innocent infringer defense in P2P settings.  More specifically, it 
examines how those courts have interpreted § 402(d) of the Copyright Act 
as an absolute bar to claims of innocent infringement rooted in the phrase 
“access to published copies,” despite not conducting a fact-finding inquiry 
into the defendant’s actual circumstance.173
A.  The Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ Non-application of Innocent 
Infringement to the P2P Setting 
  This part concludes with a 
survey of various critiques of these opinions based in part on the Second 
Circuit’s decision in D.C. Comics. 
In BMG Music v. Gonzalez,174 a defendant in a P2P downloading action 
attempted to apply both fair use and innocent infringement defenses to 
copyright infringement.175  Cecilia Gonzalez—an unemployed mother of 
five176—was ultimately held liable for $22,500 in statutory damages for 
thirty acts of copyright infringement.177
Gonzalez originally downloaded more than 1,370 copyrighted songs 
from the KaZaA network,
 
178 which she claimed was merely a “sampling” 
for purchase at a later date.179  Furthermore, Gonzalez owned the vast 
majority of the disputed songs on over 250 CDs, which she claimed she had 
downloaded in order to avoid the labor of ripping them to her computer.180
 
 171. See RIAA v. the People:  Five Years Later, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. 1 (Sept. 30, 
2008), https://www.eff.org/files/eff-riaa-whitepaper.pdf [hereinafter Five Years Later]. See 
generally Groennings, supra note 
  
Despite the confusion over when she purchased some of the songs—either 
after or before they were downloaded—Gonzalez conceded that she never 
161, at 572–77 (discussing the importance the Ninth 
Circuit’s opinion had in causing the RIAA to “focus[] exclusively against direct infringers”); 
John Borland, RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers, CNET NEWS (Sept. 8, 2003), 
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023_3-5072564.html (further noting that the RIAA considered 
such personal infringement to be “egregious”).  
 172. See Five Years Later, supra note 171, at 1. 
 173. See infra notes 191–93, 212–15 and accompanying text. 
 174. 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 175. See id. at 889, 892. 
 176. See RIAA v. the People:  Two Years Later, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. 6 (Nov. 3, 2005), 
http://w2.eff.org/IP/P2P/RIAAatTWO_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter Two Years Later]. 
 177. See Gonzalez, 430 F.3d at 889; see also RIMMER, supra note 134, at 211–14 
(surveying the Gonzalez decision). 
 178. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d at 889. 
 179. Id. at 889–90. 
 180. See Two Years Later, supra note 176. 
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owned a legitimate version of thirty songs that formed the basis for the 
plaintiff’s action.181
Gonzalez first claimed that her actions constituted a “fair use.”
 
182  Fair 
use is an exception to copyright holders’ exclusive rights and a defense to 
copyright infringement that asks a district court to consider four factors.183  
In evaluating her defense, the court examined the fourth factor, “‘the effect 
of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work.’”184  Gonzalez contended that her sampling increased the overall 
market value of the songs as a form of extra advertising, akin to “try-before-
you-buy.”185  Both the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois and the Seventh Circuit rejected the argument, holding that 
downloading a full-length copy of a song cannot be considered a fair use.186  
On appeal, Judge Frank H. Easterbrook cited both Grokster and Napster in 
countering the economic benefit theory of “try-before-you-buy,” as he 
reasoned that many people do not end up buying the songs in question.187
After Gonzalez was found liable, BMG Music chose to receive statutory 
damages under § 504(c)(1) of the Copyright Act, as opposed to proving 
actual injury, and Gonzalez sought damage mitigation as an innocent 
infringer.
 
188  Both the trial and appellate courts, however, held that 
§ 402(d)189 barred innocent infringer mitigation because Gonzalez had 
“access” to copyright notice on published CDs that contained the songs she 
ultimately downloaded.190
Judge Easterbrook’s interpretation of § 402(d) was predicated on a theory 
of inquiry.
 
191  Gonzalez had “access” to proper notice, he reasoned, not 
because there was a digital stamp of such notice,192
 
 181. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d at 890. 
 but because she “could 
 182. Id. at 889. 
 183. These four factors are: 
  (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;  
  (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
  (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
  (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work. 
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 184. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d at 890 (quoting § 107). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 891; see RIMMER, supra note 134, at 211–12 (discussing the Northern District 
of Illinois’s decision). 
 187. See Gonzalez, 430 F.3d at 890; see also RIMMER, supra note 134, at 212–13 
(describing Judge Easterbrook’s rejection of Cecila Gonzalez’s fair use claim approvingly). 
 188. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d at 891–92. 
 189. 17 U.S.C. § 402(d) (2006).  The text of § 402(d) reads:  “If a notice of copyright . . . 
appears on the published phonorecord or phonorecords to which a defendant in a copyright 
infringement suit had access, then no weight shall be given to such a defendant’s 
interposition of a defense based on innocent infringement . . . .” Id.  
 190. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d at 892. 
 191. See RIMMER, supra note 134, at 212. 
 192. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d at 892.  While acknowledging that Gonzalez “downloaded data 
rather than discs, and the data lacked copyright notices,” Judge Easterbrook held that the 
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have learned, had she inquired, that the music was under copyright.”193  
This interpretation has been called “troubling” because there was no fact-
finding inquiry into whether the defendant did—or even practically could—
see the notice in question.194
The Fifth Circuit has recently taken a similar approach in Maverick 
Recording Co. v. Harper.
 
195  Whitney Harper, a sixteen-year-old from 
Texas, was charged with downloading thirty-seven songs through the 
KaZaA network.196  It was undisputed that Harper did not rip any of these 
songs from her own CDs, but rather downloaded them directly from the 
internet to her computer.197  The plaintiffs—various recording companies 
who held the copyrights to the songs in question—discovered Harper’s 
activity through the use of MediaSentry, a company that specializes in 
forensic investigation of computer systems.198  MediaSentry initially 
discovered that 544 songs had been “shared” from Harper’s computer in 
2004.199
During discovery, MediaSentry was allowed to reexamine Harper’s 
computer.
 
200  This revealed that, in 2005, the operating system had been 
reinstalled and therefore the majority of the alleged 544 files had been 
destroyed in the process.201  However, this new investigation discovered 
another group of 700 sound recordings.202  Due to the confusion 
surrounding file destruction, the plaintiffs’ amended complaint only 
pursued infringement claims for thirty-seven counts of copyright 
infringement.203
Similar to Gonzalez, the plaintiffs elected to receive statutory damages 
under § 504(c)(1), only to be greeted with a claim of innocent 
infringement.
 
204  Harper contended that she did not understand the nature of 
a P2P network, but rather believed that her actions were “akin to listening 
to a non-infringing internet radio station.”205
 
“statutory question is whether ‘access’ to legitimate works was available rather than whether 
infringers earlier in the chain attached copyright notices to the pirated works.” Id. 
 
 193. Id. 
 194. See RIMMER, supra note 134, at 213–14; infra Part III.B.ii. 
 195. 598 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 590 (2010); see generally Chad 
A. Sanders, Note, Maverick Recording Co. v. Whitney Harper:  How the Fifth Circuit 
Virtually Eliminated Innocent Infringers Without Noticing, 13 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 
295 (2010) (commenting on the Harper decision at the circuit court level). 
 196. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Harper, 131 S. Ct. 590 (No. 10–94), 2010 
WL 2797543, at *3. 
 197. Harper, 598 F.3d at 194. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Of these files, a significant amount were copyrighted sound recordings owned by the 
plaintiffs. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id.; see Sanders, supra note 195, at 295 (discussing the use of MediaSentry during 
discovery). 
 202. Fifteen of these songs formed the basis for new allegations in the plaintiffs’ 
complaint. Harper, 598 F.3d at 194–95. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 198; see Sanders, supra note 195, at 295–96 (discussing Whitney Harper’s 
claim of innocence). 
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The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas granted 
plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and entered an injunction against 
Whitney Harper in August 2008.206  The court did, however, find a genuine 
issue of fact as to Harper’s “innocence.”207  The plaintiffs reserved the right 
to appeal the innocent infringer issue if Harper appealed the judgment.208  
Interestingly, the plaintiffs only moved for judgment in the amount of $200 
per infringement, which was granted.209  Harper appealed the grant of 
summary judgment to the Fifth Circuit and the plaintiffs cross-appealed on 
the innocent infringement issue.210
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s failure to grant summary 
judgment on the innocent infringement issue, relying on the text of 
§ 402(d).
 
211  Writing for the court, Judge Edith Brown Clement found that 
the circumstances of Harper’s P2P downloading made innocent 
infringement mitigation “unavailable to her as a matter of law.”212  The 
court held that the “plain language” of the notice exception overrode 
Harper’s claim that “she was too young and naive to understand that the 
copyrights on published music applied to downloaded music.”213  
Examining the context of the simultaneous elimination of the notice 
requirement and the creation of § 402(d)’s notice exception,214 the court 
noted that “it would make no sense for a copyright defendant’s subjective 
intent to erode the working of § 402(d), which gives publishers the option 
to trade the extra burden of providing copyright notice for absolute 
protection against the innocent infringer defense.”215  The court therefore 
held that Harper could not claim that her own unsophistication merited 
mitigation because the plaintiffs had, pursuant to § 402(d), taken the extra 
step of attaching physical copyright notice to their CDs.216
With the innocent infringer defense eliminated as a matter of law, the 
court proceeded to examine the amount due under the statutory damage 
provision.  Given that the plaintiffs only sought the statutory minimum of 
$750 on appeal,
 
217
 
 206. Harper, 598 F.3d at 195. 
 however, the actual “culpability” of Harper was 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id.  This is somewhat ironic because $200 per act is the exact minimum allowed 
after innocent infringement damage mitigation. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006). 
 210. Harper, 598 F.3d at 195. 
 211. Id. at 199. 
 212. Id. at 198. 
 213. Id. at 199.  Judge Clement further noted that “Harper’s reliance on her own 
understanding of copyright law—or lack thereof—is irrelevant in the context of § 402(d).” 
Id. 
 214. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text. 
 215. Harper, 598 F.3d at 199; see Sanders, supra note 195, at 301 (noting that the “Fifth 
Circuit only cited § 402’s legislative intent and history in its rejection of the lower court’s 
opinion”). 
 216. Harper, 598 F.3d at 199. 
 217. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2006). 
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effectively a non-issue and no jury trial was warranted.218  The Fifth Circuit 
granted the plaintiffs an award of $27,750 for the thirty-seven songs.219 
Harper sought review of her judgment by the Supreme Court, but certiorari 
was ultimately denied. 220
Thus, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have interpreted § 402(d) to 
automatically defeat a claim of innocent infringement in a P2P download 
setting by broadly reading the word “access” to mean a general availability 
and a duty to inquire as to whether the songs in question were protected 
under the copyright law.
 
B.  The (Predominantly) Academic Critique of Harper and Gonzalez’s 
Understanding of § 402(d) 
  
In general, criticisms of the RIAA’s actions against P2P network users 
have been plentiful.  Popular points of debate include excessive damage 
claims for willful infringers221 and an overly aggressive strategy under 
which several lawsuits were brought on completely frivolous grounds.222  
The decisions in Harper and Gonzalez were likewise subject to academic 
discussion.223
 
 218. Harper, 598 F.3d at 199 (stating that “because Plaintiffs requested the minimum 
statutory damages under § 504(c)(1), Harper’s culpability is not an issue and there are no 
issues left for trial.”). 
  This section examines two facets of those arguments 
opposing the Fifth and Seventh Circuits.  First, some critics, including 
 219. Id. 
 220. Justice Samuel A. Alito did, however, dissent from the denial of certiorari. See 
Harper v. Maverick Recording Co., 131 S. Ct. 590, 590 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari). 
 221. One now-famous case is that of Joel Tenenbaum, where the original award of 
$22,500 per song for willful infringement was recently held to be a violation of the his due 
process rights and reduced to $2,500 per song. See Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 
721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 87 (D. Mass. 2010), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, Nos. 10-
1883, 10-1947, 10-2052, 2011 WL 4133920 (1st Cir. Sept. 16, 2011).  Another example of 
an extraordinarily high damage award is the case of Jammie Thomas-Rasset, where, in the 
latest retrial, a jury awarded $80,000 per song for willful infringement, amounting to $1.9 
million in total. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1050 (D. 
Minn. 2010). 
 222. See, e.g., Ray Beckerman, Oregon RIAA Victim Fights Back; Sues RIAA for 
Electronic Trespass, Violations of Computer Fraud & Abuse, Invasion of Privacy, RICO, 
Fraud, RECORDING INDUSTRY VS THE PEOPLE (Oct. 3, 2005, 9:50 AM), 
http://recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.com/2005/10/oregon-riaa-victim-fights-back-
sues.html (single parent suing RIAA back); Benny Evangelista, Download Lawsuit 
Dismissed / RIAA Drops Claim that Grandmother Stole Online Music, S.F. CHRON. (Sept. 
25, 2003), http://articles.sfgate.com/2003-09-25/business/17508258_1_riaa-kazaa-
downloading; Andrew Orlowski, RIAA Sues the Dead, REGISTER (Feb. 5, 2005, 2:30 PM), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/02/05/riaa_sues_the_dead; see also D.C. Comics Inc. v. 
Mini Gift Shop, 912 F.2d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that Warner Brother’s harassed the 
defendants in the early stages of discovery).  This has led to an overall negative perception 
of the RIAA. See Catherine Greenman, Taking Sides in the Napster War, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
31, 2000, at G1. See generally RIMMER, supra note 134, at 206–18 (discussing various 
improper lawsuits filed on behalf of the RIAA); Groennings, supra note 161, at 576–87 
(discussing the inadvertent negative impact the RIAA’s strategy has fostered). 
 223. See RIMMER, supra note 134, at 216–18 (surveying the academic responses to the 
RIAA’s litigation strategy). 
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Justice Samuel A. Alito, focus on the aspect that § 402(d) may not be 
applicable to P2P downloading because the law and its terms were founded 
in an analog era.224  Others, such as Professor Charles Nesson, argue that 
even if § 402(d) did apply to the digital age, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ 
interpretation of “access”—and their creation of a duty of inquiry—is 
overly ambiguous.225
1.  Distinctions Between the Analog and Digital Worlds 
  Lastly, this section revisits D.C. Comics as a possible 
point of conflict among the circuits. 
As discussed in Part II, the analog world in which the Berne Convention 
and § 402(d) were implemented was dramatically different than the present 
digital environment.226  In his dissent from Harper’s denial of review, 
Justice Alito began by acknowledging the “strong argument that § 402(d) 
does not apply in a case involving the downloading of digital music 
files.”227
As a starting point, § 402(d) was developed before the internet or P2P 
downloading was even an inkling, and therefore, the copying against which 
those statutes sought to protect was analog in nature.
   
228  The fundamental 
difference between these two paradigms has not been acknowledged by 
either the Seventh or Fifth circuit.229  Justice Alito focused on the context 
of § 402(d) to posit the theory that it may be inapplicable in the digital 
era.230  The logic of that section was founded on the analog understanding 
that since an individual is copying music from an object that contains the 
appropriate notice, they possess a “reason to believe that his or her acts 
constituted an infringement of copyright.”231  Because “a person who 
downloads a digital music file generally does not see any material object 
bearing a copyright notice,” the fundamental nature of § 402(d) is called 
into question.232
 
 224. See, e.g., Harper v. Maverick Recording Co., 131 S. Ct. 590, 590 (2010) (Alito, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 
 225. See Motion of Charles Nesson et. al. as Amicus Curiae for Leave to File Brief in 
Support of Petitioner at 10, Harper, 131 S. Ct. at 590 (No. 10–94), 2010 WL 3279299, at 
*10 [hereinafter Nesson Brief]. 
 226. See supra Part II.A. 
 227. Harper, 131 S. Ct. at 590 (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (stating that 
§402(d) was “adopted in 1988, well before digital music files became available”). 
 228. See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 10:63 (4th ed. 2011) (explaining that § 402(d) was originally concerned with 
tape and record piracy); see also Lemley & Reese, supra note 103, at 1374–75 (explaining 
how digitization changed the landscape for copyright infringement “as the costs of producing 
and disseminating copies approach zero, the public goods problem gets worse, because the 
ratio of cost of creation to the cost of imitation approaches infinity” and furthermore “unlike 
end-user copying in the analog environment, online copying by end users can be quite 
substantial”). 
 229. See Nesson Brief, supra note 225, at 26 (stating that the “two courts that have 
addressed this issue as it arises in a digital context have failed to take account of either the 
statute or the realities of the internet”). 
 230. See Harper, 131 S. Ct. at 590 (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 231. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006); see supra notes 70–76 and accompanying text.  
 232. Harper, 131 S. Ct. at 590 (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
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In general, there is no standard way for an end-user to see a copyright 
notice in a digital environment.233  While popular music services, such as 
Apple’s iTunes, contain the appropriate notice, it is extremely doubtful that 
any song downloaded through a P2P network would.234  Furthermore, 
Justice Alito noted that the plain language of § 402(d) presents another 
problem if it were to apply to digital files.235  That section’s limitation only 
applies when notice appears on “phonorecords.”236  Phonorecords are 
defined as “material object[s] in which the sounds are first fixed.”237  
Therefore, it is doubtful that an MP3 or any other type of digital music file, 
even if notice was in some way attached to it, would qualify as a 
“phonorecord” under the statute.238
Some commentators believe that analog-based laws are so ill-suited to 
the digital age that the copyright regime should be dramatically altered.
 
239  
The majority of these proposals focus on the ease, extent, and 
overwhelming commonality of modern-day digital downloading as a basis 
for their disillusioned view of the current system.240
Ann Litman has posed a possible solution to the “digital dilemma”
 
241 
premised on a radical redrawing of copyright boundaries.242  The system 
would build off the public perception–and usually misconception–of a 
“distinction between commercial and noncommercial behavior.”243
 
 233. See Chad J. Woodford, Innocent Infringers and Copyright Notices in the iTunes Age, 
L. OFF. CHAD J. WOODFORD (July 21, 2010, 8:11 PM), http://woodfordiplaw.com/blog/
2010/7/21/innocent-infringers-and-copyright-notices-in-the-itunes-age.html. 
  This 
view directly addresses some of the concerns of innocent infringement as 
the question would become “what effects [downloading from a P2P 
network] had on the copyright holder’s opportunities for commercial 
 234. Compare id., with BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 892 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(explaining that the disputed songs in Gonzalez did not contain any copyright notice “on” 
them). 
 235. See Harper, 131 S. Ct. at 590 (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 236. 17 U.S.C. § 402(d) (2006). 
 237. Id. § 101. 
 238. See Harper, 131 S. Ct. at 590–91 (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Ben 
Sheffner, Peer-to-Peer Defendant Seeks Supreme Court Review of ‘Innocent Infringer’ 
Ruling, COPYRIGHTS & CAMPAIGNS (May 27, 2010, 8:43 AM), 
http://copyrightsandcampaigns.blogspot.com/2010/05/peer-to-peer-defendant-seeks-
supreme.html. 
 239. See infra Part III.B.i. 
 240. See Lemley & Reese, supra note 103, at 1373–79 (premising the alternative dispute 
resolution system on the fact that the digital era sees “substantial” copying done by 
traditional end-users in addition to professional counterfeiters); see also LITMAN, supra note 
99, at 180–81 (predicating her commercial/non-commercial copyright structure on mass 
public perception concerning the legality and ease of MP3 downloads and using Napster as 
an example for the system’s potential uses). 
 241. See  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 110, at 23–25 (noting the challenges that 
technological advances have presented to copyright legislation). 
 242. See LITMAN, supra note 99, at 180; see also supra notes 150–51 and accompanying 
text (describing Justice Stevens’s distinction between commercial and non-commercial use 
in Sony). 
 243. LITMAN, supra note 99, at 180. 
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exploitation.”244  The commercial effect standard would be narrowly 
defined so that only “large-scale interference[s]” by substantial uploaders—
but not personal, end-user digital downloads—would be actionable.245  
While a self-admitted “radical” change, Litman’s alternative system further 
acknowledges the current statutory regime’s inadequacy in the digital 
era.246
Mark Lemley and R. Anthony Reese have proposed other alternatives.
 
247  
Their theories also respond to the shortcomings of the RIAA’s earlier 
strategy of suing “facilitators” as a problematic and potentially dangerous 
“[l]umping [of] legal and illegal conduct together.”248  One system 
proposed by Lemley and Reese would involve a levy, through which 
copyright holders would be compensated in “a form of blanket compulsory 
license[s], authorizing copying in exchange for a set fee.”249  This levy 
would be automatically attached to infringement-prone devices, such as 
computers, or P2P user software, thus eliminating any need for P2P civil 
actions, innocent or not.250  While such a system has the advantage of ease 
of enforcement, the authors acknowledge that this system—similar to suing 
indirect infringers—does not target the actual infringing public.251
Another proposal would involve an independent dispute resolution 
system designed to address digital downloading.
 
252  The Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) has already 
implemented a similar system with regard to internet domain name 
trademark disputes.253
 
 244. Id.; see also Greenman, supra note 
  While ICANN’s system does have some procedural 
222 (discussing the public’s perception of P2P 
downloading). 
 245. LITMAN, supra note 99, at 180–81 (“The fact that a particular individual’s viewing or 
copying of a digital work might itself supplant the sale of a license to view or copy if such 
licenses were legally required should count neither as making money nor as large-scale 
interference with commercial opportunities.”). 
 246. Id. at 180. 
 247. Lemley & Reese, supra note 103, at 1395. 
 248. Id. at 1379.  The authors focused on the problematic “binary choice” seen in 
Grokster and Napster, where courts are forced with a decision to ban or not to ban that is ill-
suited to the reality that such networks have both legitimate and illegitimate uses. Id. at 
1380. 
 249. Id. at 1406.  Lemley and Reese’s system is based off of similar proposals by William 
Fisher and Neil Netanel. See generally WILLIAM FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP:  
TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT (2004); Neil W. Netanel, Impose a 
Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 2 
(2003). 
 250. Lemley & Reese, supra note 103, at 1406. 
 251. Id. at 1408. 
 252. See id. at 1410–25. 
 253. See id. at 1411.  ICANN’s system, the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, allows 
for trademark disputes to be heard in an expedited, organized manner in front of a panel of 
private dispute resolution experts. See Have a Problem? Dispute Resolution Options, 
ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/dispute-resolution/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2011); see also 
Lemley & Reese, supra note 103, at 1411 (noting that, as of 2004, the UDRP system had 
“resolved about 7500 such disputes involving over 13,000 domain names in four years, at a 
cost of $1200-$1500 each and an average resolution time of little more than a month”). 
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deficiencies,254 Lemley and Reese argue that an analogous system for 
“relatively straightforward claims of copyright infringement . . . against 
those alleged to have uploaded copyrighted works to a p2p network and 
thus made them available for downloading by others” would be 
beneficial.255  By limiting the dispute system to uploaders who have 
contributed a substantial number of songs to a P2P network,256
2.  Access and Inquiry 
 this would 
(similar to Litman’s commercial distinction) protect this Note’s 
paradigmatic innocent infringer. 
This next section focuses on aspects of criticism that assume that 
§ 402(d) applies to the scenario in question.  Critics focusing on this aspect 
argue that the circuits have incorrectly interpreted the term “access” and 
unjustly created an ambiguous duty of inquiry on virtually all P2P users that 
prevents them from innocent infringement mitigation by operation of law. 
a.  Access 
As discussed in Part III.A, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have held 
“access” to mean a broad, general availability of a published record marked 
with appropriate copyright notice.257  Phrased otherwise, notice is 
satisfied—and hence § 402(d) bars innocent infringement mitigation—
when the copyright holder affixes notice to a CD jewel case and that case is 
made available through some public means, typically through sale at a 
store.258  Interestingly, both circuits have explicitly acknowledged that there 
is no standard way to affix notice to a digital song,259 and have formulated 
their understanding of “access” accordingly, viewing “the statutory question 
[as] whether ‘access’ to legitimate works was available rather than whether 
infringers earlier in the chain attached copyright notices to the pirated 
works.”260
Copyright blogger Joe Gratz argues that this definition is troubling 
because the Seventh Circuit does “not describe how or why this ‘access’ 
exists, but it apparently finds access in the fact that Gonzalez could have 
gone to the record store and inspected authorized copies.”
 
261
 
 254. See Lemley & Reese, supra note 
  Therefore, the 
argument has been made that the plain language of the statute, as well as its 
103, at 1412 (noting a lack of a standardized 
appeals process for disputes). 
 255. Id. at 1413. 
 256. Id. at 1419 (Lemley and Reese’s proposal would set the minimum at fifty works, 
which would also look to incentivize various copyright holders to join their complaints, thus 
further streamlining the process). 
 257. See supra Part III.A. 
 258. See BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 892 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 259. See supra notes 233–34 and accompanying text. 
 260. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d at 892. 
 261. Joe Gratz, 7th Cir.:  P2P Downloading Is Not Fair Use, JOEGRATZ.NET (Dec. 10, 
2005), http://joegratzdotnet.nfshost.com/?p=737. 
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legislative history, merits the opposite reading, and bars innocent infringer 
mitigation only “when notice is sufficiently presented to the infringer.”262
Harvard Law Professor Charles Nesson, notable for his work in other 
controversial copyright suits,
 
263 filed, along with others, an amicus curiae 
brief in support of Harper’s appeal to the Supreme Court.264  In Professor 
Nesson’s view, § 402(d)’s requisite “access”—as required by the circuits—
is incompatible with digital downloading.  Because “a person viewing an 
internet file in cyberspace who genuinely does not know or have reason to 
know that the file is copyrighted, [published notices in record stores] 
provide neither actual notice nor reasonable notice of copyright.”265  Others 
also feel the underlying rationale of Harper is “thin,” because the Fifth 
Circuit drew its conclusion solely from legislative history and “relied 
almost exclusively on a treatise to support its holding.”266
Justice Alito seemingly agrees with the above criticism, remarking that 
“[u]nder this interpretation, it is not necessary that the infringer actually see 
a material object with the copyright notice.”
 
267  Directly attacking the 
rationale of Gonzalez, Justice Alito noted that this scheme rendered 
innocent infringement mitigation unavailable merely because an individual 
could have researched the song in question.268
These various critics are not alone in their understanding of “access,” as 
the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia employed a 
similar rationale in Electra Entertainment Group v. McDowell.
  The problematic interplay 
between the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ understandings of “access” and 
inquiry is examined in greater detail in the following subsection. 
269  
McDowell was based on a nearly identical fact pattern as Harper.270  The 
defendant, Sarah McDowell, was only thirteen or fourteen years old at the 
time of infringement.271  McDowell admitted to forty-eight counts of 
copyright infringement from P2P network downloads.272
 
 262. Nesson Brief, supra note 
  The plaintiffs 
225, at 26. 
 263. Professor Nesson has given legal assistance to such other notable P2P defendants as 
Jammie Thomas-Rasset, see Nate Anderson, “It is Groundhog Day”:  Third Jammie Thomas 
P2P Trial Begins, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 2, 2010, 9:21 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2010/11/third-jammie-thomas-p2p-trial-begins-it-is-groundhog-day.ars; and 
Joel Tenenbaum, see John Schwartz, Tilting at Internet Barrier, a Stalwart is Upended, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 11, 2009, at A11.  
 264. See generally Nesson Brief, supra note 225. 
 265. Id. at 10. 
 266. Sanders, supra note 195, at 300–01 (while a criticism, the author ultimately 
concluded that the decision was “properly articulated” with respect to the interplay between 
§ 402(d) and § 504(c)(2)). 
 267. Harper v. Maverick Recording Co., 131 S. Ct. 590, 591 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari). 
 268. See id. (stating that “it is enough [under Gonzalez] that the infringer could have 
ascertained that the work was copyrighted”). 
 269. No. 4:06-CV-115, 2007 WL 3286622, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 6, 2007). 
 270. See id. at *1; supra notes 195–210 and accompanying text. 
 271. See Electra, 2007 WL 3286622, at *2. 
 272. Id. at *1 (noting that while plaintiffs contended that McDowell was “actively 
distributing more than one thousand songs” on a P2P network, they only sought damages for 
forty-eight acts of infringement). 
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moved for summary judgment and an award of $750 per song in statutory 
damages, totaling $36,000.273  In response, McDowell moved for a jury 
trial on the issue of innocent infringer mitigation under § 504(c)(2).274
The Middle District of Georgia began its analysis with an examination of 
Gonzalez and § 402(d)’s applicability to P2P downloading.
 
275  The 
plaintiffs contended that Sarah McDowell’s actions were analogous to 
Cecilia Gonzalez’s because she had “access to copyright notice at any 
location sound recordings are sold” and therefore was not due mitigation.276  
Further, they argued that because McDowell had purchased a CD in the 
past—although not necessarily one containing copyright notice or songs 
controlled by the plaintiffs—that McDowell had practical access to notice 
as well.277  While the court considered the fact that McDowell had 
purchased a CD in the past relevant,278 it held that she “did not state 
whether she regularly purchased compact disks from retail stores at the time 
she infringed upon Plaintiffs’ copyrights.”279  Moreover, given the young 
age of the defendant, further inquiry into the defendant’s “access” was 
justified because at the time of infringement “any compact disk she may 
have owned would have been bought for her by her mother.”280  If this was 
so, commentators have noted that it would be the mother who had notice 
and not the daughter who merely received the CDs and later downloaded 
separate songs through a P2P network.281
The court found there to be two legitimate questions of fact and denied 
the plaintiff’s motion.
 
282  First, by virtue of the defendant’s young age and 
unsophistication, there was a question as to whether she was “aware or 
ha[d] reason to believe that her acts constituted an infringement of 
copyright.”283  Assuming arguendo that the first question would be 
answered in the affirmative, the court found another question as to whether 
Sarah McDowell “had access to the notice of copyright such that her 
innocent infringer defense has no mitigating effect.”284
 
 273. Id.; see also Zohar Efroni, Electra Entertainment v. McDowell:  Is a Thirteen Year 
Old Still Innocent (Infringer)?, STAN. L. SCH.:  CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Nov. 14, 2007, 
5:17 PM), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/node/5610. 
  Thus, unlike the 
 274. Electra, 2007 WL 3286622, at *1. 
 275. Id. at *2. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. at *2 n.2. 
 278. The court’s consideration of this fact is in-and-of itself a large departure from 
Gonzalez and Harper. See id. at *2. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. at *2 n.2. 
 281. See Efroni, supra note 273 (noting that practically, the fact that the mother in 
McDowell may be on notice is of little significance because if the daughter was to be found 
liable, it would be the mother who ultimately paid damages). 
 282. Id. (noting that the two factual questions were interrelated). 
 283. Id. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006).  Justice Alito agrees with this 
interpretation that age should be a factor in an innocent infringement inquiry. See infra note 
293 and accompanying text. 
 284. Electra, 2007 WL 3286622, at *2. 
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courts in Gonzalez and Harper, § 402(d) did not have an automatically 
preclusive effect.285
b.  Duty of Inquiry 
 
Another critique focuses on the circuits’ interpretation of “access” to 
seemingly create a duty of inquiry.  Such a duty, it is argued, “imposes an 
undue burden on all internet users, no matter how young and unschooled, to 
determine whether files accessible to them in cyberspace are 
copyrighted.”286  One critic has called this interpretation “shaky” at best.287  
Joe Gratz notes that this problematic definition of “access” is a mere rubber 
stamp and warned that “if ‘access’ in the copyright context now means that 
someone could have inspected a copy of a work had they inquired, we may 
find some mighty odd results in cases looking to whether a small-potatoes 
plaintiff has shown that a big-time movie studio had access to her 
unsolicited screenplay.”288
This ambiguity was a major point of concern for Justice Alito, who stated 
that the “Fifth Circuit did not specify what sort of inquiry a person who 
downloads digital music files is required to make,”
 
289 although he noted 
that those courts “had in mind” various activities such as “research on the 
Internet or a visit to a local store in search of a compact disc containing the 
songs in question.”290  In recognition of this ambiguity, some advocate—at 
the minimum—for a fact finding inquiry to determine how and if the notice 
bearing CDs were practically accessible to the defendant.291
In examining whether an infringer has met their duty of inquiry, the Fifth 
and Seventh Circuits have discounted their claim of a “lack of legal 
sophistication.”
 
292  Justice Alito noted that disregarding such a crucial 
factor would be incorrect if § 402(d) did not automatically eliminate a 
finding of innocent infringement and the determinative question were 
simply whether the defendant had “reason to believe” that her actions were 
illegal.293
 
 285. See supra notes 
 
186–92, 211–16 and accompanying text. 
 286. Nesson Brief, supra note 225, at 12. 
 287. Gratz, supra note 261. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Harper v. Maverick Recording Co., 131 S. Ct. 590, 591 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari). 
 290. Id. 
 291. See Phil Hill, Maverick Recording Company v. Whitney Harper, MUSIC THINK TANK 
(June 7, 2010), http://www.musicthinktank.com/blog/maverick-recording-company-v-
whitney-harper.html (noting that, under Gonzalez and Harper’s definition of access, 
“everyone is beholden to a warning that they may not understand, may not know to look for, 
located on an object that they may not know exists, located in a store [that] they may never 
go to”).  Hill further notes that it is not unreasonable, especially in locations such as Texas 
(where Whitney Harper lived) to be more than fifty miles away from the nearest record store. 
Id. 
 292. See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
 293. Harper, 131 S. Ct. at 591 (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).  Justice 
Alito continued in remarking that “[a]lthough ‘reason to believe’ is an objective standard, it 
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In her petition to the Supreme Court, Harper referred the Court’s 
attention to D.C. Comics, where the Second Circuit used objective criteria 
in discussing the infringer’s “lack of business sophistication” and possible 
duty of inquiry.294  While that case dealt with the sale of t-shirts and other 
movie merchandise, the court nevertheless examined whether a defendant 
claiming innocent infringement under § 504(c)(2) ever has a duty to inquire 
as to the copyright status of the goods in question.295  Similar to Whitney 
Harper, the various shop owners claimed that they were too naïve to 
understand the nature of their actions.296  Furthermore, both matters 
involved infringing copies that were entirely indistinguishable from a 
proper, notice-bearing version.297  Taken together, the Second Circuit found 
that the defendants were too naïve to “prompt an inquiry into the source of 
the unmarked goods,” and were therefore proper recipients of § 504(c)(2) 
mitigation.298
IV.  WHY THE BROAD DEFENSE-ELIMINATING READING OF § 402(D) 
IS INCORRECT 
 
Having analyzed the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ interpretations of 
innocent infringer claims in Part III, this Note argues that the broad reading 
of “access” taken by those circuits is improper for a variety of reasons.  
First, the legislative history demonstrates that § 402(d) was implemented in 
 
is by no means clear that certain objective characteristics of the infringer—such as age—
may not be taken into account.” Id. 
 294. D.C. Comics Inc. v. Mini Gift Shop, 912 F.2d 29, 35–36 (2d Cir. 1990); see Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 196, at 13.  The petition contended that Harper and D.C. 
Comics demonstrated a stereotypical circuit split on the issue of “whether a plaintiff may 
avoid the defense of innocent infringement by including a copyright notice on published 
copies of its copyrighted work even though those copies are not the copies that the infringer 
used for its infringement.” Id.  However, even Justice Alito, in his dissent from denial of 
certiorari, noted that there is no circuit split on such an issue. See Harper, 131 S. Ct. at 591 
(Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 295. D.C. Comics, 912 F.2d at 36.  It is essential to note, however, that § 402(d) does 
have a near-identical sister provision applying to non-sound recordings. See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 401(d) (2006).  Section 401(d) has been applied to a variety of works; the most analogous 
to the infringement seen in D.C. Comics has been fabric designs. See generally Langman 
Fabrics v. Graff Californiawear, Inc., 160 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 296. Compare D.C. Comics, 912 F.2d at 35 (stating that “defendants were unsophisticated 
merchants”), with Maverick Recording Co. v. Harper, 598 F.3d 193, 199 (5th Cir.) 
(recounting that Harper “contended only that she was too young and naive to understand” the 
seriousness of her actions), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 590 (2010). 
 297. Compare D.C. Comics, 912 F.2d at 35 (stating that “a layman would not be able to 
distinguish between licensed and unlicensed [Batman] goods based on the style or quality of 
the art work”), with Harper, 598 F.3d at 198 (noting that the only notice associated with the 
sounds recordings in question appeared “on each of the published phonorecords from which 
the audio files were taken” and not the files themselves), and BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 
F.3d 888, 892 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that Cecilia Gonzalez “downloaded data rather than 
discs, and the data lacked copyright notice”). 
 298. D.C. Comics, 912 F.2d at 35 (stating that the “[p]laintiffs’ own evidence also 
established that the defendants were unsophisticated merchants”).  This, of course, only 
refers to those defendants who initially appeared at trial. See supra notes 87–89 and 
accompanying text (noting that several defendants defaulted and could not be found to have 
innocently infringed). 
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an analog era and was never meant to foreclose the innocent infringer 
defense automatically.299
A.  The Realities of the Digital Age 
  Second, the formation of a duty of inquiry and 
the understanding of “access” as general availability effectively eliminate 
the innocent infringer provision in a P2P setting, which is a far too dramatic 
conclusion not to have been made explicit in the legislation. 
As technology continues to advance at exponential rates, end-users are 
changing the way they receive and manipulate digital information.300  Since 
copyright law is both conceptually abstract and characterized by public 
misconception, it makes greater sense either for Congress to modify the 
current law or for judges to interpret the existing law with such fundamental 
differences in mind.301
Those who support the broad reading of “access” fail to acknowledge the 
differences between copyright infringement in the analog and digital eras.  
The Fifth Circuit attempted to justify its position by noting the simultaneous 
destruction of the notice requirement and the creation of the notice 
exception to innocent infringement found in § 402(d).
 
302  While the Harper 
court correctly noted this trade off,303 focusing only on whether the 
copyright holders have provided notice in some form is problematic.  Those 
supporting the above decisions are essentially “remov[ing] the innocent 
infringer defense altogether” in a digital context.304  This position cannot be 
supported by the plain text or legislative history of sections 402(d) and 
401(d), or the Berne Act, in which the “placement” of notice was discussed 
as a specific tool against innocent infringement.305
 An examination of the legislative history of the Berne Act highlights 
some problematic aspects of the Gonzalez and Harper decisions.
 
306  At that 
time, as in the entire history of innocent infringement,307 notice was 
expressly seen as a protection for mitigation, not as an excuse for its 
elimination.308  In discussing § 402(d)’s non-music corollary, § 401(d),309
 
 299. The differences between the analog and digital era are further demonstrated by the 
massive commonality of P2P downloading as a new end-user “norm.” See supra notes 
 
120–
23 and accompanying text. 
 300. See supra Part II.A. 
 301. See supra notes 106–15 and accompanying text. 
 302. See, e.g., Maverick Recording Co. v. Harper, 598 F.3d 193, 199 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(providing the historical justification for its reasoning), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 590 (2010). 
 303. See id. 
 304. Nesson Brief, supra note 225, at 26. 
 305. See infra notes 309–11 and accompanying text; see also Nate Anderson, Supreme 
Court Told P2P Users Can Be “Innocent Infringers,” ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 20, 2010, 11:03 
AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/08/supreme-court-told-p2p-users-can-
be-innocent-infringers.ars (“The law was written in an analog era, and it targeted those who 
copied tapes or CDs. Such people couldn’t claim not to know about the copyrighted nature 
of the works they were copying . . . [b]ut in the digital world, this makes no sense.  How 
could slapping a copyright notice on a CD alert anyone using a P2P network about 
anything?”). 
 306. See generally S. REP. NO. 100-352 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706. 
 307. See supra notes 35–37, 62–67 and accompanying text. 
 308. See supra notes 208–15 and accompanying text. 
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notice was understood to “alert[] users to the fact that copyright is claimed 
in the work in question, and . . . prevent many instances of unintentional 
infringement.”310  The placement mandated by § 402(d) was an effective 
“alert” because in the analog age, one needed that original, notice-laden 
copy in order to infringe in the first place.311
 The alternative solutions suggested by Litman, Reese, and Lemley—
while some are obviously more radical than others—all acknowledge that 
digital downloading must be addressed in a fundamentally different manner 
than the current, outdated statutory scheme.
  Therefore, there is no 
statutory history to justify the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ destruction of the 
innocent infringer defense in the P2P context because copyright notice was 
located on the physical CDs, but not on the digital files that Harper and 
Gonzalez encountered.   
312  The added complexity 
around whether the term “phonorecord” in § 402(d) applies to digital music 
files further demonstrates that the provision’s analog nature renders it 
inapplicable to digital acts of infringement.313
Once the circuits’ problematic justification is discounted, one can return 
to the actual legislative intent behind the mitigation provision of 
§ 504(c)(2):  to preserve the innocent infringer defense.
   
314  A scheme that 
examines the defendants’ circumstances to determine their innocence would 
fall in line with both the original incarnations of the defense315 and the 
1976 Act that established the modern clause.316  While the long-term goal 
should be to revise the Copyright Act to acknowledge the realities of P2P, 
the arguments of Justice Alito and Professor Nesson demonstrate that § 
402(d) can be interpreted in a manner that requires an actual inquiry into the 
defendant’s sophistication and circumstances and does not eliminate 
innocent infringer mitigation for digital infringement.317
B.  Why the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ Definition of Access Is Problematic 
 
Given the fundamental differences discussed above, the definition of 
“access” as “availability” is conceptually impractical.  As Justice Alito 
warned, a defendant under that scheme can be found to have had access to a 
notice they never could have encountered in a practical manner.318  The 
analysis advocated by critics, and employed by the Middle District of 
Georgia in McDowell, provides an example of how a practical inquiry into 
access would work.319
 
 309. See supra note 
  Under this system, if the court found that a 
defendant had physical access to a notice-bearing CD jewel case, then 
295 and accompanying text. 
 310. S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 43, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3740–41. 
 311. See supra notes 112–18 and accompanying text. 
 312. See supra notes 241–56 and accompanying text. 
 313. See supra notes 235–38 and accompanying text. 
 314. See supra notes 70–79 and accompanying text. 
 315. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text. 
 316. See supra Part I.B.iii. 
 317. See supra Part III.B. 
 318. See supra note 267 and accompanying text. 
 319. See supra notes 269–81 and accompanying text. 
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§ 402(d) would bar damage mitigation.320  Once § 402(d) is no longer seen 
as an absolute bar to mitigation, courts will be able to review the infringer’s 
circumstances objectively, as Justice Alito advocated, to determine whether 
they actually had reason to know their acts constituted infringement.321  
The Second Circuit’s opinion in D.C. Comics demonstrates that a court 
could find a lack of legal sophistication, along with a virtually 
indistinguishable difference between an infringing and legitimate copy—
much like the situations of Whitney Harper and Sarah McDowell—to be 
appropriate circumstances for granting mitigation.322
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ response to the above has been that the 
defendant had “access” because they were automatically put on notice, and 
therefore had a duty to inquire about the copyrighted status of the files in 
question.
 
323
First, she can assume, incorrectly, that all music is copyrighted.  
Alternatively, she can embark on an open-ended quest to verify copyright.  
Ultimately, even if no copyright notice is found, it will never be safe to 
assume that a work is in the public domain.  Under this scheme, innocent 
infringement can never be proved.
  Such a duty is simply too vague, however, to be practically 
implemented.  As Professor Nesson warned, the risks of such a system 
would present two improper effects on a casual internet user accessing a 
perfectly legitimate P2P network: 
324
One could imagine many examples where the appropriate CD containing a 
song in question is located in a notice-laden jewel case that is hundreds of 
miles away.
 
325  The Fifth and Seventh Circuits, however, would still hold 
that this scenario is an appropriate example of “access” to said notice, and 
would never look into such factors when determining if mitigation is 
warranted.326
The reason that access in the above sense is inappropriate in the context 
of P2P is that the nature of the infringement is radically different.
 
327  When 
analog provisions were written, we were still in an age where copyright 
infringement was mainly undertaken by professional counterfeiters who 
needed to have a physical copy in order to infringe.  In that analog world, 
§ 402(d) made perfect sense because there would be no scenario where one 
could avoid said notice.  In the digital age, however, anyone can download 
and copy a song with great ease and without ever being presented with 
copyright notice anywhere in the timeline.328
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  Only once the legal 
community recognizes this fundamental difference can the concept of 
289–91 and accompanying text. 
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innocent infringement survive.  Condoning the views of the Harper and 
Maverick courts runs the risk of accepting the effective elimination  without 
any direction from Congress of one of the few protective provisions in an 
already controversial statutory damage regime. 
CONCLUSION 
In his dissent from denial of certiorari in Harper, Justice Alito noted that 
in the “post-‘phonorecord’ age” we need to closely scrutinize copyright 
standards articulated long before digital means of infringement were 
developed.329  He cautioned that “not many cases presenting this issue are 
likely to reach the Courts of Appeals.”330  The innocent infringement 
debate therefore likely will remain stagnant until other circuits analyze the 
relevant provisions of the 1976 Act.331
Nevertheless, it is important to continue to advocate for a change in 
copyright law that acknowledges the realities of P2P and the digital age.  In 
the interim, district judges should apply analog standards with this 
fundamental difference in mind and be careful not to discard innocent 
infringement.  While perhaps morally questionable to some, P2P 
downloading remains a constant phenomenon of modern culture.
 
332  The 
question should not be whether Whitney Harper’s actions were “wrong,” 
but rather whether her punishment should be reduced because she did not 
have “reason to believe” her acts constituted copyright infringement.333  
This distinction is crucial because the most common example of innocent 
infringement today—and the kind most deserving of the defense—occurs 
when an individual, like Whitney Harper, Sarah McDowell, and countless 
others, “knowingly copies from an existing work and reasonably but 
erroneously believes, because of copyright law’s complex and often 
indeterminate scope, that her copying is permitted, not prohibited, by 
copyright law.”334  Only once others understand that innocent infringement 
is not an absolution of liability, but rather a mere reduction to account for 
one’s naïveté, can we return to our legislature’s original intent to afford 
some protection to innocent infringers.335
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